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Issues in the Third Circuit
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TO PUNISH OR NOT TO PUNISH?
THAT IS THE QUESTION. TAYLOR V CISNEROS: ADDRESSING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CIVIL
SANCTIONS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
A punishment is "[a] ny fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a
person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a
court, for some crime or offense committed by him."' The purpose of
punishment is to deter future crime and to place a punitive restraint on
the criminal. 2 Nevertheless, the power to punish is subject to constitu-
tional constraints. 3 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
protects against successive or multiple punishments for the same crime.
4
The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment,
as well as the imposition of excessive fines.5 The Ex Post Facto Clause
protects against laws applying retroactively, thus allowing for increased
punishment.6 Finally, the United States Constitution forbids the states
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1991).
2. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) ("[P]unishment
serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (discussing aims of punishment). Punitive is defined
as "[rielating to punishment; having the character of punishment or penalty."
BLACK's LAW DIcrIoNARY 1234 (6th ed. 1991).
3. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) (stat-
ing that power to inflict sanctions, whether civil or criminal, is subject to constitu-
tional constraints). For a discussion of these specific constitutional constraints, see
infra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
4. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). The Supreme Court has held
that "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." Halper,
490 U.S. at 440; see Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 339, 396 (1995) (stating that
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against "'punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally, for the same offense"' (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))).
5. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see also
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (explaining that "the funda-
mental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consider-
ation of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense").
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (applying same restriction to
states by stating "[n]o State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder"). The Ex Post
(1831)
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from "pass[ing] a Bill of Attainder," that is, the legislature cannot inflict
punishment upon an individual without ajudicial trial. 7 To invoke any of
these constitutional protections, the accused must first prove as a thresh-
old matter that the action taken against him or her is punishment.8
Over the past several years, legislatures have increased the use of civil
sanctions, forfeitures and registration provisions to penalize sex offenders
as well as to combat the harsh effects of other crimes. 9 The use of civil
Facto Clause of the Constitution prevents the government from applying laws ret-
roactively that "inflict[ ] a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed." Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1253 (3d Cir. 1996).
The United States Supreme Court defined the circumstances that the Ex Post
Facto Clause encompasses in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). First,
the Ex Post Facto Clause covers "[e]very law that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal." Id. (emphasis
omitted). Second, the Ex Post Facto Clause also encompasses "[e]very law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed." Id. (empha-
sis omitted). Third, "[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed" is en-
compassed under the protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. (emphasis omit-
ted). Fourth and finally, the Ex Post Facto Clause covers "[e]very law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the
offender." Id. (emphasis omitted); see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46
(1990) (re-establishing Calder categories); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70
(1925) (rephrasing Calder categories as "any statute which punishes as a crime an
act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more bur-
densome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one
charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the
act was committed").
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any Bill of Attain-
der .... ."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applying this restriction to federal
government as well by stating that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed"). Thus, the Constitution prohibits legislatures from enacting measures
"'that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.'"
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1253 (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448-49
(1965)).
8. See generally United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2138 (1996) (revisiting
issue of whether civil in rem forfeitures are considered punishment for double jeop-
ardy purposes); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 769 (addressing issue of whether tax on
illegal drugs constitutes punishment, and thus, violates Constitution's prohibition
against double jeopardy); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993)
(noting that whether civil remedy violates Excessive Fines Clause turns on whether
such action is punishment); Halper, 490 U.S. at 441 (addressing "whether the statu-
tory penalty authorized by the civil False Claims Act... constitutes a second 'pun-
ishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis"); United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) (discussing whether civil in
rem forfeiture legislation possessed punitive intent required to constitute violation
of Double Jeopardy Clause); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164
(1963) (determining that issue of whether divesting American citizenship for draft
evasion or military desertion violated protections of Fifth and Sixth Amendments
turned on, as initial matter, whether such action is "penal in character.").
9. See, e.g., Kevin Cole, The Civil-Criminal Distinction: Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 249, 250-51 (1996) ("[The] forfeiture remedy continues
to spread."); Barbara A. Mack, Double Jeopardy-Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punish-
2
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sanctions has increased partly because such proceedings do not invoke the
stringent constitutional procedural protections that criminal proceedings
do.10 In United States v. Halper,11 Austin v. United States12 and Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,13 the Supreme Court changed and confused the
law in the area of unconstitutional punishment.' 4 In these cases, the
Court carved out a few instances when certain civil sanctions rise to the
level of punishment and cross over the distinction between civil and crimi-
nal penalties. 15 The Court, however, did not speak in general terms and
ment: Who Determines What Punishments Fit the Crime, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 217, 243
(1996) (explaining that government's increasing concern about organized crime
and drugs led to enactment of "plethora" of laws that involved forfeiture of pro-
ceeds of crimes and property used to facilitate crime); New White House Heartens
Environmentalists, MASS. L. WKLY., Feb. 8, 1993, at B39 (noting that forfeiture laws
have been proposed as remedy for environmental crimes modeled after current
drug forfeiture laws). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994), and the "Continuing Criminal Enterprise"
section of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994), began the trend
toward increased civil forfeiture of criminal proceeds. See Mack, supra, at 243 (dis-
cussing how federal civil forfeiture laws began trend toward increased use of forfei-
ture as response to crime). In the 1980s, Congress amended the federal drug laws
to authorize forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug crimes. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(1)-(4) (1994) (providing that "[a]ll conveyances.., which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in. any manner to facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances, their raw
material, and equipment used in their manufacture and distribution]" are subject
to forfeiture); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (providing that "[a] ll real property, including
any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any
lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used ... to
commit . . .a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment" is subject to forfeiture for violating drug offenses). For a discus-
sion of the legislative history of § 881, see infra note 52. There are currently sev-
eral other types of forfeiture in effect today. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ASSET FORrxTUtRE: COMPILATION OF CIVIL STATUTES (1987) (detailing forfeiture
statutes currently in effect).
10. See LEONARD W. LEW, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY
106 (1996) (noting that civil forfeiture proceedings invoke less constitutional pro-
tection than criminal forfeiture proceedings); David Osgood, Crime and Punishment
and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double Jeopardy and the War on Drugs, 71 WASH. L.
REv. 489, 490 (1996) (discussing how civil forfeiture offers many procedural advan-
tages over criminal forfeiture, such as lesser burden of proof and avoidance of
other constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants).
11. 490 U.S. 435.(1989).
12. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
13. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
14. See id. at 769 (addressing issue of whether tax on illegal drugs constitutes
punishment that violates Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy); Aus-
tin, 509 U.S. at 609-10 (stating that whether civil remedy violates Excessive Fines
Clause depends on whether such action can be considered punishment); Halper,
490 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that civil penalty constituted punishment for double
jeopardy purposes).
15. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 (stating that, in assessing punitive nature of
fine, labeling fine "civil" or "criminal" is irrelevant). The Supreme Court ex-
plained that a civil penalty becomes punishment under the Double Jeopardy
3
Patterson: Constitutional Law - To Punish or Not to Punish - That Is the Que
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLAOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 1831
did not carve out bright-line rules in its analysis. 16 This sporadic prece-
dent left lower courts confused as to which civil actions trigger the consti-
tutional restrictions on punishment.
17
This Casebrief analyzes how the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has interpreted and applied the relevant Supreme Court
precedent in the area of civil sanctions and constitutional punishment.
This Casebrief also attempts to clarify the controlling analysis in the Third
Circuit for determining whether a civil penalty or sanction amounts to
unconstitutional punishment. Part II details the relevant Supreme Court
cases that have addressed the issue of determining what is punishment for
Clause when the civil penalty "may not fairly be characterized as remedial." Id. at
449.
16. See id. at 449 ("What we announce now is a rule for the rare case."); see also
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996) (stating that Halper, Austin
and Kurth Ranch do not alter traditional understandings of punishment determina-
tion for double jeopardy and civil in rem forfeiture, but rather these cases deal with
specific facts and do not have general application to punishment analysis).
17. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding in-
correctly that "under Halper and Austin, any civil forfeiture under § 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (7) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes"), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2135 (1996); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221-22
(9th Cir. 1994) (concluding incorrectly that forfeiture statute constitutes punish-
ment under Halper and Austin and that this conclusion will force government "to
include a criminal forfeiture count in the indictment (and thus forego the
favorable burdens it would face in the civil forfeiture proceeding) or to pursue
only the civil forfeiture action (and thus forego the opportunity to prosecute the
claimants criminally)"), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Exemplifying the confusion
that Supreme Court precedent had caused in the punishment analysis, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ursery, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits held that Supreme Court precedent required a finding
that civil in rem forfeiture constituted punishment and, thus, invoked constitu-
tional restrictions on punishment. See Ursery, 59 F.3d at 573 (finding that, under
Halper and Austin, any civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes); $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221-22 (concluding that forfei-
ture statute constitutes punishment under Halper and Austin). Other circuits dis-
agreed with the Sixth Circuit in Ursery and the Ninth Circuit in $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency and concluded that Halper and Austin did not control in deciding whether
civil in rem forfeiture was punitive. See Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879, 882-83
(7th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Sixth and Ninth Circuits because there is "noth-
ing in Austin which precludes the conclusion that a defendant has no claim to the
proceeds of drug trafficking and that those proceeds are by definition directly pro-
portional to the loss to the government and society"); United States v. $184,505.01
in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1169 n.15 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting conclusions of
Sixth and Ninth Circuits and finding that Supreme Court precedent did not con-
trol determining civil in rem forfeiture as punishment), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 48
(1996); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
Ninth Circuit's "categorical approach to double jeopardy analysis"); United States
v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing "civil forfeitures of
property proportionately related to the offense from forfeitures of conveyances
and real property, which, because of the dramatic variations in their value, bear no
relation to the underlying offense"); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 298-300
(5th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Halper and Austin as controlling precedent in cases
addressing punitive nature of civil in rem forfeiture).
1834
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the purpose of invoking constitutional protections.' 8 Part II also discusses
United States v. Ursery,'9 the most recent Supreme Court case in this area. 2
0
Part III discusses how the Third Circuit has interpreted and synthesized
the Court's relevant precedent into a three-part test for determining
which civil actions constitute punishment.2 1  Part III also focuses on the
Third Circuit's application of that test in light of Ursery.22 Ultimately, this
Casebrief outlines the, appropriate analysis in the Third Circuit for ad-
dressing the constituti onality of civil sanctions and comments on whether
the Third Circuit made an appropriate and sound assimilation of the
Supreme Court case law in formulating a test for assessing what amounts
to unconstitutional punishment.
23
II. BACKGROUND
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[c]riminal fines, civil penalties,
civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain features: They generate gov-
ernment revenues, impose fiscal burdens on individuals, and deter certain
behavior. All of these sanctions are subject to constitutional con-
straints."24 The Supreme Court has held that the government or the vic-
tim may seek civil relief with respect to the same act or omission that is
considered criminal. 25 Civil sanctions purport to serve a remedial pur-
pose for'victims of crime.26 The government and the individual victim of
18. For a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court cases in determining
which civil actions are punishment invoking constitutional restrictions, see infra
notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
19. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
20. For a discussion of Urseiy, see infra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit has interpreted Supreme Court
precedent for determining which civil actions 'constitute punishment, see infra
notes 95-122 and accompanying .text.
22. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's development of a three-part test to
deteirmine which civil actions constitute punishment, see infra notes 123-74. and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the current analysis used in the Third Circuit for deter-
mining whether a civil sanction constitutes punishment, see infra notes 175-88 and
accompanying text.
24. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) (noting
that civil sanctions, like criminal sanctions, are subject to constitutional
restrictions).
25. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (holding that govern-
ment may impose criminal and civil sanctions for same act or omission, however,
determination of whether civil sanction is punishment is question of statutory
construction).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989) (stating that
government is entitled to remedial justice through compensation by criminals);
Mack, supra note 9, at 244 (arguing that forfeiture laws were "designed to target
those at the top of the drug distribution ladder-those who live off the profits
illegally derived from the addictions and misfortunes of others ... [and] forfeiture
laws were, and remain, a valuable tool for fighting organized crime, major drug
activity, and other crimes motivated by greed"). The "civil remedy" is "the remedy
afforded by law to a private person in the civil courts in so far as his private and
1997] 1835
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a crime may use this route as a remedial measure for the loss that crime
causes.27
The Supreme Court, however, has not readily upheld all types of civil
measures. In De Veau v. Braisted,28 the Court recognized that determining
the punitive nature of certain civil sanctions requires an inquiry into the
actual legislative purpose of the measure.29 In De Veau, the Court ad-
dressed an ex post facto and bill of attainder challenge to a New York
statute that barred labor organizations whose officers were convicted
felons from collecting dues. 30 The Court held that, in analyzing cases in
which an individual suffers unpleasant consequences for prior conduct, a
court should look to the legislative purpose of the measure imposing such
consequences. 3 1 The Court explained that the legislative intent or subjec-
individual rights have been injured by a delict or crime; as distinguished from the
remedy by criminal prosecution for the injury to the rights of the public." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1294 (6th ed. 1991). The civil remedy is "afforded by law to a
private person in the civil courts in so far as his [or her] private and individual
rights have been injured by a delict of a crime." Id. But see Cole, supra note 9, at
250 (suggesting that civil forfeiture is "mere anarchism" and cannot be justified in
contemporary society).
27. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4), (7) (1994) (requiring forfeiture of prop-
erty based upon illegal drug possession); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1n (West 1996
& Supp. 1997) (allowing for removal of tenant for use of illegal drugs on apart-
ment complex premises). Statutory forfeiture is a very common type of civil rem-
edy. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613-18 (1993) (detailing history and
prevalence of forfeiture in United States as civil remedy); LEVY, supra note 10, at 1-
43 (detailing history of civil forfeiture and discussing popular use of forfeiture in
response to illegal drug activity).
Recently, sexual predator registration and notification laws have created new
questions about the constitutionality of civil sanctions. See Daniel Armagh, Registra-
tion and Community Notification Laws, PROSECUTOR, May-June 1996, at 10 (detailing
mechanics of sexual predator registration and notification laws in various states);
see also Lori N. Sabin, Note, Doe v. Poritz: A Constitutional Yield to an Angry Society,
32 CAL. W. L. REV. 331, 351-56 (1996) (detailing constitutionality of New Jersey's
sexual predator registration and notification law named "Megan's Law"). Numer-
ous state and federal courts have addressed the constitutionality of sexual predator
registration and notification laws. See State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1044 (Kan.
1996) (noting that many courts have addressed this issue and finding that registra-
tion provisions are constitutional but notification provisions violate Ex Post Facto
Clause of Constitution), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997). For a list of state com-
munity registration laws, see infra note 102.
28. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
29. See id. at 160 (emphasizing importance of actual legislative purpose in as-
sessing punitive nature of statute).
30. See id. at 145 (describing action brought by officer of International Long-
shoremen's Association). The act in question was the New York Waterfront Com-
mission Act of 1953, N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 6700aa (McKinney 1996). See DeVeau,
363 U.S. at 144-45 (discussing effect of New York Waterfront Commission Act on
appellant's eligibility to hold office).
31. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 160 (stating that judicial inquiry should focus on
"whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or
whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a
regulation of a present situation").
1836
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tive purpose of a civil penalty is relevant in assessing whether it constitutes
punishment.3 2
Generally, the Supreme Court has held that civil in rem forfeiture does
not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.33
The Court has found that civil in rem forfeiture has a remedial rather than
punitive purpose.3 4 In recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed
whether other civil sanctions violate constitutional limitations on punish-
32. See id. The Court upheld the statute on these constitutional grounds. See
id. The Court explained "that New York sought not to punish ex-felons, but to
devise what was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront,
and for the effectuation of that scheme it became important whether individuals
had previously been convicted of a felony." Id.
33. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147-48 (1996) (concluding
that intent and effect of civil in rem forfeiture statutes was not to impose punish-
ment); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984)
(holding that civil in rem forfeiture proceeding after acquittal of criminal activity
does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause); Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause is
not applicable to forfeiture because forfeiture is not criminal offense).
34. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362 (explaining that relevant inquiry in assess-
ing punitive nature of forfeiture is "whether ... [the] proceeding is intended to
be, or by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial" and
concluding under this analysis that forfeiture is remedial). The Court in 89 Fire-
arms pointed out that "[r]esolution of this question begins as a matter of statutory
interpretation." Id. First, the court must determine whether Congress "in estab-
lishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a prefer-
ence" for punitive or remedial purposes. Id. Second, if the intention of Congress
was to establish a civil penalty, then the court must probe further to ascertain
"whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention." Id. at 362-63. The Court explained that a conclusion that
such a measure is punitive should be evidenced by the "'clearest proof' that Con-
gress has provided a sanction so punitive as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly in-
tended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."' Id. at 366 (quoting Rex Trailer
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)); see Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 214748
(invoking analysis used in 89 Firearms to assess constitutionality of civil in rem forfei-
ture); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1972)
(explaining generally that Congress did not intend for civil in rem forfeiture to be
criminal punishment). For a discussion of Ursery, see infra notes 75-94 and accom-
panying text.
1997] 1837CASEBRIEF
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ment.35 In these cases, the Court has made the constitutionality of civil
proceedings less clear.
3 6
A. Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch: The Punishment Trilogy
Although civil remedies legitimately exist as remedial measures for
the government, such penalties may not drastically exceed the actual loss
suffered as a result of the crimes.3 7 In United States v. Halper, the Court
recognized for the first time that a civil sanction, as well as a criminal sanc-
tion, can amount to unconstitutional punishment.3 8 In Halper, the Gov-
ernment indicted the defendant for sixty-five counts of Medicare fraud.
3 9
The Government then sought civil remedial damages, under the False
Claims Act, 40 from Halper.41 Under this action, the Government was enti-
tled to receive $130,000 in fines from Halper, although the actual dam-
ages for his fraudulent Medicare claims amounted to only $585.42 In
35. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994)
(holding that Montana drug tax violated Double Jeopardy Clause because purpose
of penalty was not remedial); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993)
(holding that, "[i]n light of the historical understanding of forfeiture as punish-
ment, the clear focus of § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) on the culpability of the owner,
and the evidence that Congress understood those provisions as serving to deter
and to punish," forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 is not remedial and violated Ex-
cessive Fines Clause); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (explain-
ing "that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or de-
terrent purposes, is punishment").
36. See United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining
that evaluation of civil sanctions under "the Double Jeopardy Clause [is] dimly lit
by" Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996).
37. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50 (concluding that Government is entitled to
remedial justice, but that remedy must be in proportion to loss sustained).
38. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("[P]unishment . .. cuts across the division
between the civil and the criminal law.").
39. Id. at 437. Halper was a manager of New City Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
a company that provided medical services for patients eligible for Medicare bene-
fits. See id. The Government alleged that between 1982 and 1983 Halper de-
manded reimbursement for several claims at $12 per claim when the actual service
rendered entitled New City to only $3 per claim. See id. at 435. Specifically, this
was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, which prohibits "mak[ing] or presen[ting] ...
any claim upon the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent." Halper, 490 U.S. at 435 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 287 (1994)). Ajury convicted Halper on all counts. See id. He was sen-
tenced to two years in prison and fined $5000. See id.
40. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994). Specifically, the False Claims Act imposes
liability on any person who uses false records to get the Government to pay a false
claim. See id. § 3729 (stating that person is liable who "knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid or approved").
41. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
42. See id. at 439. The remedial provisions of the False Claims Act provided
that a person "is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of
$2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sus-
tains because of the act of that person and costs of the civil action." Id. at 438
1838
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finding that this civil penalty violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Court held that a nominal "civil" penalty constitutes punishment if its ac-
tual purpose serves the punitive goals of retribution and deterrence.
43
The Court explained that when a civil penalty "is so extreme and so di-
vorced from the Government's damages and expenses," it constitutes pun-
ishment.44 The Halper Court recognized that rare cases may arise when
civil penalties cross the line between remedial and punitive and violate the
Constitution's protection against double jeopardy. 45
The historical understanding of a civil penalty is also a significant fac-
tor in assessing its punitive nature under the Constitution.4 6 In Austin v.
United States, the Court held that forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4)
and (a) (7), which allow for forfeiture of drug proceeds, amounted to pun-
ishment under the Excessive Fines Clause. 47 In Austin, the defendant was
indicted on four counts of violating the drug laws in South Dakota. 48 Af-
ter the defendant pleaded guilty to one count and received his sentence,
the United States initiated in rem proceedings against the defendant's
property pursuant to § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) .49 The Court addressed the
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729). Because Halper violated the False Claims Act 65 times,
under § 3729, he was subject to a $130,000 penalty. See id.
43. See id. at 448. The Court noted that "[i]n drafting his initial version of
what came to be our Double Jeopardy Clause,James Madison focused explicitly on
the issue of multiple punishment: 'No person shall be subject, except in cases of
impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence.'"
Id. at 440 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
44. Id. at 442. The Court explained that civil penalties lose their remedial
character when the fines imposed far exceed the damage that the Government
suffered. See id. at 448. The Court made it clear, however, that civil remedies are
not a per se violation of the Constitution if they allow for recovery "in excess of the
Government's actual damages." Id. at 442. Nevertheless, under the civil False
Claims Act, Halper was subject to "liability of $130,000 for false claims amounting
to $585." Id. at 441.
45. Id. The Court held that subsequent civil sanctions that "may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution may amount to
punishment... [and] rise to the level of a violation of Double Jeopardy." See id. at
448-49. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits subjecting a
defendant to a subsequent civil sanction that cannot fairly be characterized as re-
medial. See id. In a particular case, if a civil or criminal fine "serves the goals of
punishment. .. [and] the twin aims of retribution and deterrence," it is punish-
ment. Id. at 448. Thus, the Court put forth a proportionality balancing test for
assessing the punitive nature of some civil sanctions. See id. at 449-50; see also
Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1254 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing rule in
Halperas "[o]bjective [p]urpose through [p]roportionality"). In essence, the rule
the Court carved out in Halper is one "for the rare case." Halper, 490 U.S.. at 449.
46. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610-11 (1993) (holding that his-
torical understanding of forfeiture is relevant in assessing whether such penalty is
punishment).
47. Id. at 622. For the language of § 881, see supra note 9.
48. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604 (noting that defendant pleaded guilty to one count
of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment).
49. See id. at 604-05. Austin's auto body shop and his mobile home were for-
feited. See id.
9
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sole question of whether this civil action violated the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause. 50 In concluding that there was a constitutional
violation, the Court held that resolution of this issue turned on "whether,
at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, forfeiture was understood
at least in part as punishment and whether forfeiture . . .should be so
understood today."51 The Court held that traditional historical under-
standings of forfeiture led to the conclusion that the forfeiture in this case
constituted punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause.52 The Court's
50. See id. at 606. The last time the Court had addressed this issue was in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989),
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 606. In Browning-Ferris, the Court held that the Excessive
Fines Clause "does not limit the award of punitive damages to a private party in a
civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right
to receive a share of the damages." Id. (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264).
The Court also concluded in Browning-Ferris that both the Eighth Amendment and
section 10 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the Eighth Amend-
ment is derived, were intended to prevent the government from abusing its power
to punish. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-67. Austin overruled Browning-Ferris, in
part, by holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not prevent civil fines unless
"that proceeding is so punitive that it must be considered criminal under Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242
(1980)." Austin, 509 U.S. at 607-08. In Austin, the Court clarified that the focus is
not on whether the statute is criminal, but whether it is punishment. Id. at 610.
For a discussion of Mendoza-Martinez, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
51. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11. The Court looked at what types of forfeiture
existed in England at the time the United States ratified the Eighth Amendment:
the deodand, felony forfeiture and statutory forfeiture. See id. at 611. The Court
stated:
At common law the value of an inanimate object ... causing the acciden-
tal death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand ....
When application of the deodand to religious or eleemosynary purposes
ceased, and the deodand became a source of Crown revenue, the institu-
tion was justified as a penalty for carelessness.
Id. Felony forfeiture resulted when "'[t] he convicted felon forfeited his chattels to
the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of
his property, real and personal, to the Crown."' Id. at 611-12 (quoting Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974)). Finally, the
Court noted that "'English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending ob-
jects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws."' Id. at 612 (quoting
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682). The Court noted that the deodand, felony forfei-
ture and statutory forfeiture all have elements of punishment, however, only statu-
tory forfeiture was adopted in the United States. See id. at 613.
52. See id. at 622. In analyzing § 881 under this historical framework, the
Court noted that "forfeiture has been justified on two theories-that the property
itself is 'guilty' of the offense, and that the owner may be held accountable for the
wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property." Id. at 615. In the Court's
opinion, the rationale for forfeiture rests on punishing the negligence of the own-
ers. See id. The Court concluded that, regardless of the fact that the First Congress
did not consider forfeiture "to be beyond the purview of the Eighth Amendment,"
they did consider it to be punishment. Id. at 613. The Court also pointed out that
the legislative history of § 881 confirms that it is punitive. See id. at 620. When
Congress added subsection (a) (7) to § 881 in 1984, it "recognized 'that the tradi-
tional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or
punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs."' Id. at 620 (quoting
S. RFP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983)). The Court noted that Congress "characterized
1840
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holding in Austin clarifies that the traditional historical understanding of
the statutory civil penalty is another factor to consider in assessing the
punitive nature of a statute that inflicts a civil sanction.
53
The Supreme Court has also stated that, in assessing the punitive na-
ture of civil sanctions, the reviewing court should look to the true salutary
nature of the measure.54 In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, the
Court held that Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act 55 imposed a criminal
penalty and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.56 In Kurth Ranch the
respondents were convicted of possession of marijuana. 57 In addition to
the criminal charges against the respondents, the Department of Revenue
also instituted a proceeding pursuant to the Dangerous Drug Tax Act.
58
In addressing whether the particular tax violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court looked at'whether it operated in a manner typical of
the forfeiture of real property as 'a powerful deterrent.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
98-225, at 195); see also 124 CONG. REc. 34670-71 (1978) (noting penal nature of
forfeiture statutes). Finally, the Court held that "[i]n light of the historical under-
standing of forfeiture as punishment, the clear focus of §§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7)
on the culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress understood those
provisions as serving to deter and to punish," the Court could not "conclude that
forfeiture under § 881 ... serves solely a remedial purpose." Austin, 509 U.S. at
621-22.
53. Austin, 509 U.S. at 620 (focusing on historical purpose of measure in de-
termining its punitive nature). Under Austin, a measure that historically serves a
punitive purpose is punishment unless the text or the legislative history indicates a
purpose to the contrary. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1257 (3d
Cir. 1996) (interpreting Austin to mean that historical understanding of sanction
together with statutory language and legislative history determine whether it is pu-
nitive for Eighth Amendment purposes).
54. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781-82 (1994)
(emphasizing importance of salutary purpose of statutory sanction in assessing its
punitive nature). "Salutary" is an objective term used to describe things that are
"health-giving" or "beneficial." MERRIAM WEBSTER DIcrIONARY 461 (10th ed. 1995).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -111 (1995) (imposing tax on posses-
sion and storage of dangerous drugs to be collected only after payment of state
and federal funds).
56. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784. The Dangerous Drug Tax Act provided for a
tax "on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs." MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-
25-111 (1). The Montana statute expressly provided that the tax "is to be collected
only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied." Id. § 15-25-
111 (3). The Act further defined a "dangerous drug" as that term is defined in the
Montana Code provisions concerning such drugs. See id. § 15-25-103(2).
57. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 772. The respondents in Kurth Ranch operated a
mixed grain and livestock farm in Montana. See id. at 771. They also used the farm
for cultivating and selling marijuana. See id. Two weeks after the drug tax came
into effect, law enforcement agencies raided the farm. See id.
58. See id. at 773. The State filed criminal charges, and the respondents even-
tually accepted a plea agreement. See id. at 772. Then, the county attorney filed
forfeiture proceedings. See id. This forfeiture action sought recovery of the cash
and equipment used in the marijuana operation. See id. The actual drugs were
not forfeited in this action because they were destroyed presumably after the
arrest. See id. The respondents settled the forfeiture action by agreeing to forfeit a
cash amount and various equipment. See id.
11
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taxes, that is, whether it served revenue-raising, rather than punitive pur-
poses.59 In concluding that the Montana drug tax refuted that nonpuni-
tive presumption, the Court emphasized that the imposition of this tax was
conditioned on the commission of a crime and that the tax was levied after
the commencement of a criminal proceeding against the taxpayer for the
same conduct that triggered liability under Montana's Dangerous Drug
Tax Act.60 Accordingly, the Court concluded that curative and remedial
justifications "vanish when the taxed activity is completely forbidden. '61
In light of Kurth Ranch, a reviewing court should emphasize the legitimacy
of the purported beneficial purpose of a civil sanction when evaluating
whether it is punitive. 62
B. Switching the Focus to the Effects of the Civil Sanction
In 1995, the Court added yet another factor in determining the puni-
tive nature of a statutory sanction. In California Department of Corrections v.
Morales,63 the Court shifted the focus of the analysis from a law's purpose
to its effect.64 Jose Morales had been twice convicted of murder in Califor-
59. See id. at 779-80. Kurth Ranch also addressed the relevance of Halper. Id. at
776-78. The Court pointed out that even though in Halper "we considered
'whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment
for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis,"' Halper does not control. Id. at 776
(quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989)). The Court concluded
that Halper does not answer the question of whether a tax may "similarly be charac-
terized as punitive." Id. at 778. For a list of cases that also limited Halper's applica-
bility to fixed penalty statutes, see infra note 83.
60. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781. The fact that the imposition of the tax
occurs only after the commission of a crime is "'significant of penal and prohibi-
tory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
61. Id. at 782. The Court also noted: "Taken as a whole, this drug tax is a
concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax
assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of double
jeopardy analysis." Id. at 783; see Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1259
(3d Cir. 1996) ("[Kurth Ranch] differentiated among taxes with a pure revenue
raising purpose, mixed-motive taxes imposed both to deter a disfavored activity
and to raise revenue, and taxes imposed upon illegal activities.").
62. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-83 (emphasizing that court should look to
true salutary purpose of statute); see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1259 (stating that under
Kurth Ranch "courts must examine whether the particular measure at issue oper-
ates in a 'usual' manner consistent with its historically salutary or mixed pur-
poses"). In this regard, the Third Circuit disagreed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's interpretation of Kurth Ranch in United States v.
Stoller, 78 F.3d 710 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996). See Artway,
81 F.3d at 1259 n.24. Stoller argues that Kurth Ranch creates a general rule
"dub[bed] the 'totality of the circumstances' test-while Halper is an 'exception'
for 'monetary' penalties." Id. The Third Circuit clarified its disagreement with
this position by stating that it is "loath to read [Halper] so narrowly without instruc-
tion from the Supreme Court... [because the court] read nothing in Kurth Ranch
indicating that it supplies the general rule and Halper provides the exception." Id.
63. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
64. Id. at 513 (determining that law's purpose had little effect because it did
not actually extend period of confinement); see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1260 (noting
1842
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nia.65 Under the law in effect at the time of his second conviction,
Morales would have been entitled to receive parole suitability hearings an-
nually.66 One year after his conviction, however, the California Legisla-
ture authorized the Parole Board to defer suitability hearings for three
years for those prisoners convicted of "more than one offense which in-
volves the taking of a life." 67 This left Morales ineligible for parole for a
longer time period than originally anticipated. 68 He appealed this result,
claiming a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 69
The Court rejected the assertion that this action violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 70 In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed whether
the amended statute increased Morales's punishment.7 1 The Court re-
jected this argument because denying the number of parole suitability
hearings that Morales originally anticipated did not have a punitive ef-
fect.72 The Court's discussion in Morales of determining punishment in
terms of the effects of a particular measure is applicable in generally as-
sessing the punitive nature of civil sanctions. 73 Consequently, Morales pro-
vides that another factor-the sanction's effect-is relevant in an overall
determination of whether a civil sanction is punitive.74
that Court in Morales shifted focus on determination of punishment from law's
purpose to its effect).
65. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 502.
66. See id. at 503.
67. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)).
68. See id. (noting that Morales's next scheduled parole hearing was to be two
years later than anticipated).
69. See id. at 504 (noting Morales filed federal habeas corpus petition assert-
ing that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights). For discussion
of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
70. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 504 (reversing Ninth Circuit finding of Ex Post
Facto Clause violation).
71. See id. at 505 (noting legislation in question effected no change in defini-
tion of Morales's crime). The Supreme Court has held that the Ex Post Facto
Clause is aimed at laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase
the punishment for criminal acts." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990).
72. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 513 (finding postponement of prisoner's suitability
hearing did not extend actual period of confinement). The Court stated that the
"California legislation at issue creates only the most speculative and attenuated risk
of increasing the measure of punishment." Id. at 514.
73. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996)
("Morales makes clear that a law can be unconstitutional because of its punitive
effect.")
74. See id. at 1261 (reading Morales to confirm that "'punishment' analysis
depends on the context").
1997] 1843
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C. United States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Explains "Where All the
Pieces Fit"
The broad language and narrow holdings in Halper, Austin and Kurth
Ranch caused some confusion in the lower courts. 75 The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits read these cases to
mean that the Supreme Court "changed . . . [its] collective mind" and
"adopted a new test for determining whether a nominally civil sanction
constitutes 'punishment' for double jeopardy purposes."76 In United States
v. Ursery, the Court clarified that it has consistently held that civil in rem
forfeitures do not constitute punishment and, thus, do not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 77
In Ursery, the defendants asserted that the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred the criminal proceedings against them because a primary forfei-
ture action amounted to punishment.7 8 In agreeing with the defendants,
the lower courts construed Austin and Halper very broadly to mean that
75. See Mack, supra note 9, at 252 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent in
this area involves "tortured analysis" that opens door for lower courts to extend
double jeopardy protection too far). For a discussion of cases that extended the
legal conclusions in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch too far, see infra notes 76-88
and accompanying text. For a list of other circuit court cases that disagreed with
the expansive treatment the Sixth and Ninth Circuits gave to Halper, Austin and
Kurth Ranch, see supra note 17.
76. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2143 (1996); see United States v.
Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996); United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
77. Id. at 2140 (noting Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil forfeit-
ures). In Ursery, the Court reaffirmed a rule that has its roots "in a long line of'
Supreme Court cases. See id.; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980) (explaining that determination of whether civil in rem forfeiture constitutes
double jeopardy turns on intent of legislature and effects of law); One Lot Emer-
ald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (rejecting owner's double
jeopardy objection to civil in rem forfeiture because it was not criminal proceed-
ing); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931)
(holding that prohibition against double jeopardy is not applicable to forfeiture
because it is not criminal offense).
78. Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2139 (noting holdings of lower courts). In Ursery, the
Government initiated forfeiture proceedings against the defendant after finding
him in possession of drugs. Id. at 2138-39. The police discovered marijuana grow-
ing adjacent to the defendant's house as well as marijuana seeds, stems, stalks and
a grow light in the house. See id. The Government instituted forfeiture proceed-
ings against Ursery's house pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) because the property
had been used "to facilitate the unlawful processing and distribution of a con-
trolled substance." Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139. Subsequently, the Government
sought a criminal conviction against the defendant for the same conduct. See id.
(noting Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana). Ursery settled the for-
feiture claim with the Government for $13,250. See id. Before this settlement, the
Government also indicted Ursery for manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139. A jury found him guilty and
sentenced him to 63 months in prison. See id. In a companion case, before the
defendants were tried on charges of conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacturer
of methamphetamine and various counts of money laundering, the United States
1844
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civil forfeiture constituted a separate criminal proceeding and violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 79 In Ursery, the Supreme Court rejected this in-
terpretation of its precedent.8 0 The Court explained the precedential sig-
nificance of Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch in assessing the
constitutionality of civil sanctions.8 ' The Court reiterated that Halper con-
sidered the constitutionality of a civil penalty, not a civil forfeiture, and
stressed that the case had a narrow focus.8 2 In Halper, the Court advised
that when assessing whether a penalty provision constitutes punishment,
the court should weigh and balance the harm suffered and the penalty
imposed on a case-by-case basis.8 3 Under this analysis, Ursery clarified that
instituted a civil in rem forfeiture action against various items of property owned by
the defendants. See id.
79. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140. The lower courts in Ursery read the language
in Halper and Austin very broadly and concluded that those cases created a general
presumption that forfeiture is a punitive measure for both double jeopardy and
excessive fines purposes. See id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction
based on its interpretation of Halper and Austin. See id. at 2139. The circuit court
interpreted these cases to mean that any civil forfeiture under § 887(a) (7) consti-
tuted punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. (noting
Sixth Circuit's view that Ursery had been "punished"). As such, the court vacated
Ursery's subsequent conviction because under its determination the conviction vi-
olated the prohibition against double jeopardy. See id.
80. Id. at 2149 (noting that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for
purpose of Double Jeopardy Clause).
81. See id. at 2143-47.
82. See id. at 2144 (noting that decision in Halper was "limited to the context
of civil penalties"). The Court elaborated that "[i]t is difficult to see how the rule
of Halper could be applied to a civil forfeiture. Civil penalties are designed as a
rough form of 'liquidated damages' for the harms suffered by the Government as a
result of a defendant's conduct." Id. at 2145; see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956) (upholding civil sanction following criminal con-
viction because liquidated damages are allowable when damages are difficult to
determine and, when reasonable, such damages are not punitive).
83. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (" [T]he determination
whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment ... requires a particularized
assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that penalty may fairly be said
to serve.") But see Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145 (noting case-by-case balancing analysis
is inappropriate for civil forfeiture). The Court in Ursery noted: "Whether a 'fixed-
penalty provision' that seeks to compensate the Government for harm it has suf-
fered is 'so extreme' and 'so divorced' from the penalty's nonpunitive purpose of
compensating the Government as to be a punishment may be determined by bal-
ancing the Government's harm against the size of the penalty." Id. (quoting
Halper, 490 U.S. at 441). Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Halper urged
that an analysis under the majority opinion is fact sensitive and dependent on the
particular nuances of the statutory measure. Halper, 490 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (determining that majority ruling "constitutes an objective rule that is
grounded in the nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case"). Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that this kind of analysis for the lower courts "would be
amorphous and speculative, and would mire the courts in the quagmire of differ-
entiating among the multiple purposes that underlie every proceeding." Id. (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). Many courts have refused to extend Halper beyond the
limited context of a monetary penalty. See United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 720
(1st Cir. 1996) ("Halper dichotomy should not be applied too far afield from its
original context (monetary sanctions designed to make the government whole for
15
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forfeitures "are designed primarily to confiscate property used in violation
of the law, and to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct,"
not to punish.
8 4
The Urseyy Court distinguished Austin because it addressed an exces-
sive fines question and Ursery dealt with a double jeopardy issue. 85 The
Court added that Kurth Ranch was distinguishable because it addressed
whether a tax, not a civil forfeiture, violated the prohibition against
double jeopardy.8 6 None of these cases dealt with the type of measure at
issue in Ursery-civil in rem forfeiture.8 7 In distinguishing these three
cases, Ursery clarified that Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch did not purport
to change the existing understandings of civil forfeiture and double
jeopardy.88
traceable losses)."), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996); United States v. Her-
nandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Halper punish-
ment test to professional disciplinary context); Manocchio v. Kusserov, 961 F.2d
1539, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that Halper analysis is not applicable to
administrative order barring doctor from participating in federal Medicare pro-
gram and applying totality of circumstances test to find that purpose of exclusion
was to protect public). The Supreme Court confirmed this limitation of Halper
and circuit courts have dutifully followed. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (stating that
Halper was limited to cases addressing constitutionality of fixed penalties); see also
United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Ursery makes clear that
Halper'was limited to the context of civil penalties."' (quoting Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at
2144)); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 725-26 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing
limits of Halper after Ursery); United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954, 956 (9th Cir.
1996) (noting that, in Urseyy, Supreme Court found Halpes calculus inapplicable
because it is "virtually impossible to quantify, even approximately, the non-punitive
purposes served by a particular civil forfeiture").
84. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.
85. Id. at 2143-44 ("We limited our review [in Austin] to the question
'whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeit-
ures of property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).' (quoting Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993))). The Court emphasized that the only
discussion of double jeopardy in Austin is to confirm that civil forfeiture does not
render itself to a double jeopardy protection. See id. at 2146 (noting Excessive
Fines Clause is not "parallel to, or even related to" Double Jeopardy Clause).
86. See id. at 2146 (stating that tax statutes serve purpose different from civil
penalties and that Halpe's method of determining whether exaction is remedial or
punitive does not work with tax statues).
87. Id. at 2143-47 (distinguishing Ursery from Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch).
In reaffirming the rule that civil forfeiture does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court drew a distinction between civil in rem forfeiture and in personam
forfeiture. See id. The Court explained that in personam civil sanctions could be
punitive, but civil in rem forfeiture could not. See id. at 2141; see also Various Items
of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (stating that in rem
proceedings are not punitive under Constitution because "[i]t is the property
which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and con-
demned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a
criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, con-
victed and punished").
88. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 ("[N]othing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin,
purported to replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not
constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."). The
1846 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
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Because Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch were not of precedential sig-
nificance, the Court in Ursery used the rule articulated in United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms9 to resolve the issue at hand.90 In 89 Fire-
arms, the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for assessing whether a
measure constitutes punishment.9 1 Under that test, a court must first ask
"whether Congress intended [the] proceedings . .. to be criminal or
civil." 92 Second, the court must inquire "whether the [effects of the] pro-
ceedings are so punitive in fact" that the court cannot conclude that they
are "civil in nature."9 3 In applying this test, the Court held that civil in rem
forfeiture proceedings are not punishment.94
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT NAVIGATES THROUGH THE SUPREME
COURT'S MAZE
A. Artway v. Attorney General: A Pre-Ursery Synthesis Addressing the
Constitutionality of Megan's Law
Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch elucidate a number of factors for de-
termining whether a civil penalty amounts to unconstitutional punish-
ment.9 5 The factors and conclusions drawn in this trilogy of cases have,
Court further noted that "[i]t would have been quite remarkable for this Court to
have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a
long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so." Id.
89. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
90. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (adopting two-part test in 89 Firearms).
91. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63 (adapting test used in United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
92. Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing 89Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366); see Ward, 448
U.S. at 248 (stating that question of determining punitive nature of civil in rem
forfeiture statute "proceed[s] on two levels," intent of Congress and effects of
measure); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972)
("[Q]uestion of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory
construction.").
93. Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366).
94. See id. at 2149 (stating civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for
purpose of Double Jeopardy Clause). The Court explained that forfeiture pro-
ceedings historically have been viewed as civil because they are an action against a
thing, in contrast to "the in personam nature of criminal actions." Id. at 2147 (citing
89Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363). In Ursery the Court pointed out that, if the intention
of Congress was to establish a civil penalty, then the court must probe further to
ascertain whether the effect of the penalty was so punitive as to negate any purpose
to the contrary. See id. 2147-48 (noting when not to give effect to Congress's in-
tent). This should be evidenced by the "'clearest proof that Congress has pro-
vided a sanction so punitive as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil
remedy into a criminal penalty."' Id. at 2142 (quoting 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at
366). The Court went on to explain that the effects of the forfeiture in
§ 881 (a) (6) and (a) (7) were not so harsh as to rebut the traditional intention of
nonpunishment. See id. at 2148 (declining to find sanctions "so punitive" as to
render them criminal).
95. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d Cir. 1996) (analyz-
ing various factors set forth in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch for assessing punitive
nature of civil sanction). For a discussion of the factors on which the Supreme
17
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however, caused great confusion in the lower courts.96 In Artway v. Attor-
ney General,97 a pre-Ursery case, the Third Circuit faced the issue of whether
the registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law violated the
Bill of Attainder, Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Consti-
tution.98 In response to the arduous task of interpreting the relevant
Supreme Court cases, the Third Circuit synthesized those cases and estab-
lished a three-prong test for determining whether a civil sanction consti-
tutes punishment for constitutional purposes. 99
Alexander Artway served seventeen years in jail for a sex offense. 10 0
After he was released, Artway settled in a community, secured employment
and married.' 0 1 On October 31, 1994, however, New Jersey enacted
Megan's Law. 10 2 Megan's Law requires that previous sex offenders regis-
Court focused in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, see supra notes 37-62 and accom-
panying text.
96. See Mack, supra note 9, at 218 (stating that shifts in law of Supreme Court
jurisprudence have created "entirely new areas of double jeopardy interpretation
with respect to parallel civil and criminal proceedings"); see also United States v.
Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that extent of application of
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch is unclear), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996).
For a list of cases that represent a circuit split over the extent of the application of
Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, see supra note 17.
97. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 1247.
99. See id. at 1263 (synthesizing uniform test for constitutional jurispru-
dence). The Artway test suggests a method of analysis for generally assessing
whether a measure is punishment under the Bill of Attainder Clause, Double Jeop-
ardy Clause and Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 1253-54 (noting purpose of test is
to determine "whether the legislative aim was to punish"). The Third Circuit ex-
plained that it would not "distinguish among the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder,
and Double Jeopardy Clauses; their differences with respect to the requisites of
'punishment,' if any, are not relevant here." Id. at 1247. The Artway analysis is not,
however, applicable for assessing whether a statutory sanction violates the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. See United States v. Various Computers and Computer Equip-
ment, 82 F.3d 582, 587-89 (3d Cir. 1996) (analyzing post-Artway excessive fines
claim under different analysis than Artway), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 406 (1996); see
also Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334, 1341 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that court
should analyze excessive fines issue directly under Austin and Various Computers,
and not under Artway). For a discussion of Various Computers, see infra note 155
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Taylor, see infra notes 123-74 and ac-
companying text.
100. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242. Ajury convicted Artway in 1971 of sodomy.
See id. at 1243. The judge found that Artway used force and sentenced him to an
indefinite term in prison. See id. Based on a previous statutory rape charge, the
sentencing judge characterized Artway's actions as "a pattern of repetitive, compul-
sive behavior." Id. Artway was released in 1992. See id.
101. See id.
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-5 (West 1995). Megan's Law was the first
of many sexual predator registration and notification laws that have emerged in
various states around the country. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1250 n.11. The law is
composed of a registration requirement, triggered if at sentencing the behavior
was "characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior," along with
three tiers of notification. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2b (1) (West 1996). The regis-
trant must provide personal information to the local law enforcement: his or her
1848 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
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name, social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and
eye color, address of legal residence and date and place of employment. See id.
§ 2C:7-4b(1). Every 90 days, the registrant must confirm his or her address, notify
the authorities if he or she moves and register again at the new location with local
authorities. See id. §§ 2C:7-2d to -2e. Law enforcement agencies are authorized to
release "relevant and necessary information [concerning registrants] when... nec-
essary for public protection." Id. § 2C:7-5a. The prosecutor of the county in which
the registrant lives is responsible for reviewing the registrant's information and
ascertaining whether the registrant represents a low, moderate or high risk of re-
peat offense. See id. § 2C:7-8d(1). The Attorney General has promulgated guide-
lines for determining which registrants are low, moderate or high risks. See Artway,
81 F.3d at 1244; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-8a to -8b (authorizing risk scale
promulgated by Attorney General). The guidelines contemplate the following fac-
tors in determining risk: (1) seriousness of the offense, (2) offense history,
(3) characteristics of the offender and (4) community support. See Artway, 81 F.3d
at 1244. These four factors are comprised of a matrix of 13 other factors: degree
of force, degree of contact, age of victim, victim selection, number of offenses and
victims, duration of offensive behavior, length of time since last offense, history of
antisocial acts, response to treatment, substance abuse, therapeutic support, resi-
dential support and employment and educational stability. See id. at 1244 n.2. In
considering all these factors, the prosecutor will place the registrant in Tier 1 (low
risk), Tier 2 (moderate risk) or Tier 3 (high risk). See id. Under Tier 2, the prose-
cutor must notify schools, licensed day care centers, summer camps and desig-
nated community organizations involved in the care of children or the support of
battered women or rape victims. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8c(2). Under Tier 3,
law enforcement agencies must notify members of the public likely to encounter
the registrant. See id. § 2C:7-8c(3). Every state has enacted a sexual predator regis-
tration law, notification law or both. See People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250
(1996) (noting universal sex offender registration requirements); see also ALA.
CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (Michie 1996);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821, 41-1750(B) (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-901 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-34123.5 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (1997); IHAw. REV. STAT. §§ 707-743 (1995); IDAHO CODE
§§ 18-8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 150/1-150/10 (West 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1-.13
(West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4907 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.510 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540 to :549 (West 1997); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11003-11004 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 629B (1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 22, § 37 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 28.721-.730 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 45-33-1 (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.600 (West 1997); MoNT. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to -4013 (1996); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.157 (Michie 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:1 to -
B:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-5 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-
IlA-1 to -8 (Michie 1996); N.Y. CoRREcr. LAw § 168 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-208.5-.13 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.08 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587
(West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.594-.600 (1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 42-9791 to -9798 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-16, -19 (1996); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 22-22-39 to -41
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (1996); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 4413(51) (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1997);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1-.3, 19.2-
390.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44130 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -10 (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West 1996); Wvo.
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ter with their local law enforcement authority. 10 3 The law also requires
community notification for registrants who are considered to present a
future risk of sex offenses.104 Artway filed suit in the United States District
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1997). The laws in Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington all have
notification provisions as well as registration provisions. See Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d at
250. Statutes in Iowa and North Carolina show a trend toward limited public dis-
closure, specifically, release of the person's name to the person making the re-
quest. See State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2508 (1997). In Vermont, certain employers can request and receive certain infor-
mation when deemed necessary to protect the public. See id. In New York and
New Jersey, the laws provide for community notification concerning certain regis-
tered sex offenders, depending on the risk level of the offender. See id. at 1029. In
Pennsylvania, the newly enacted sex offender registration law only applies to sex
offenses committed after the law's enactment. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9793.
Georgia's sex offender registration act only applies to child sex offenses. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1(a) (1997).
103. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (stating qualified offender "shall register"); see
also Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification and the Constitution, 29
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 117, 120 (1995) (noting that community notification
provisions of NewJersey's Megan's Law is most far reaching of all state laws requir-
ing either registration or notification of sex offenders); Elga A. Goodman, Com-
ment, Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted Waters, 26
SETON HALL L. REv. 764, 766 n.20 (1996) (stating that NewJersey sexual predator
law is most far reaching of all states because it is only statute that allows for notifi-
cation to law enforcement, schools, day care, youth organizations and general pub-
lic and because NewJersey law requires registration and notification for sex crimes
committed prior to its enactment).
104. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to 7-8 (noting criteria and guidelines for
community notification). In 1994, the New Jersey Legislature enacted Megan's
Law. See id. § 2C:7-1 (noting effective date of Megan's Law). The NewJersey Legis-
lature enacted this law in response to the brutal murder of seven year-old Megan
Kanka. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243 (noting origins of law). Megan's murderer was
a neighbor who lived across the street from her and her family. See id. The neigh-
bors did not know that this neighbor was a twice-convicted sex offender. See id.
Then, the legislation "was rushed to the Assembly floor as an emergency measure,
skipping the committee process, and was debated only on the floor; no member
voted against it." Megan's Law: How Fair? How Effective?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 9,
1994, at El (noting that NewJersey Legislature "moved with swiftness unusual for
legislative bodies" when enacting Megan's Law and that many legislators had ob-
jections to Megan's Law, but none were voiced); see also Douglas A. Campbell,
"Megan's Law": Is There Really a Right to Know? A Slaying Brings a Call For Action.
Consider the Offender, Therapists Say, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7, 1994, at El ("The
[public] cry was heard along Barbara Lee Drive from the Kankas' neighbors. It
was heard from politicians from Trenton to Washington.").
In May of 1996, President Clinton signed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program Act ("Act"), 42
U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 & Supp. 1997). See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1028 (noting federal
statute urging states to implement registration laws for sex offenders). The Act was
amended to include Megan's Law, authorizing disclosure for any purpose permit-
ted under state law: "A law enforcement agency 'shall release relevant information
that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to
register.'" Id. at 1028 (quoting Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345
(1996)). The Act puts the responsibility on the states to enact a sexual predator
20
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Court for the District of NewJersey challenging Megan's Law.' 0 5 The dis-
trict court held that the registration provisions of Megan's Law did not
violate the Constitution although it enjoined enforcement of the notifica-
tion aspects of the law's retroactive application. 10 6 Both parties appealed
to the Third Circuit.
10 7
To answer the question of whether the registration provision of
Megan's Law constituted punishment, the Third Circuit synthesized the
relevant Supreme Court case law and extracted a rule of law as to what
constitutes punishment under the bill of attainder, double jeopardy and
ex post facto protections. of the Constitution. 10 8 According to the Third
law as a condition to receiving federal funds. See Sabin, supra note 27, at 335 n.35
(noting that some states could lose up to 10% of funds that this Act allocates if
states do not enact sexual predator registration laws). The Act requires registra-
tion, but not notification. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (listing what information "may be
disclosed"). The Act does allow the states to require notification. Id.
§ 14071(d) (1)-(2) (stating information collected in state programs "may be re-
leased" to protect public). The Act does not apply the registration requirements
retroactively. Id. § 14071 (b) (noting person must first be released from prison,
parole, supervised release or probation in order to be required to register).
105. See Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 677 (D.N.J. 1996), affd
in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
106. See id. at 692 (finding that retroactive application of notification provi-
sions violated Ex Post Facto Clause).
107. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242. Initially, the State argued that Artway's con-
stitutional claims regarding Megan's Law were moot because he had moved out of
New Jersey. See id. at 1245-46 (noting Artway's duty to register kept him from re-
turning to New Jersey). The court rejected this argument. See id. The court ex-
plained that the "opportunity for meaningful relief is still present here" because
Artway asserted that he will move back into New Jersey if the court found Megan's
Law unconstitutional. See id. at 1246.
The State also asserted that Artway's challenges were not ripe because there
was no "case or controversy." See id at 1247. In. analyzing the ripeness issue, the
court "distinguish [ed] between the registration and notification provisions of
Megan's Law." Id. The court noted that the constitutionality of Megan's Law
could possibly turn "on the most careful parsing of the Supreme Court's rulings on
'punishment' . . . [and] the law in this area needs clarification." Id. at 1250-51.
The court pointed out that whether Artway will ever be subject to the notification
provisions of Megan's Law remains to be seen. See id. at 1251. As such, the court
held that under Article III of the Constitution, it could not undertake to dispose of
this issue "without factual tools." Id. at 1250-51.
108. See id. at 1254 (noting that court must devise test for punishment be-
cause of confused state of law in this area). In simulating this test, the Third Cir-
cuit rejected the relevancy of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1261. The Third Circuit in Artway stated that, in Mendoza-Marti-
nez, "the [Supreme] Court held that divesting American citizenship for draft eva-
sion or military desertion was 'punishment' requiring the procedural protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Id. According to the Third Circuit, Mendoza-
Matinez requires analysis of seven factors to determine whether a sanction consti-
tutes punishment:
[1] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as punitive, [3] whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, [5] whether the burden to which it applies is already a crime, [6]
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Circuit, "[a] measure must pass a three-prong analysis-(1) actual pur-
pose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) effect-to constitute non-
punishment."' 09
The Third Circuit derived the first prong, actual purpose, from the
emphasis the Supreme Court placed on the subjective legislative purpose
of the statute in De Veau v. Braisted.110 The court derived the second
prong, objective purpose, from the Supreme Court's guidance in Halper,
Austin and Kurth Ranch."' Under this prong, the reviewing court must
ask three questions. 112 First, under Halper, the court should ask if the
sanction serves solely a remedial purpose.' 1 3 Second, following Austin, the
court must determine if historical analysis illustrates whether the court
should regard the measure as punishment."l 4 Third, under Kurth Ranch,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose.
Id. at 1261-62. The district court employed this test, but the Third Circuit refused
to extend Mendoza-Martinez beyond the determination of whether a punishment is
severe enough to invoke criminal procedural rights, such as a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1262 (noting Supreme Court has made clear
that Mendoza-Martinez factors are not controlling on "punishment" determination).
But see Myers, 923 P.2d at 1040 (invoking Mendoza-Martinez factors in addressing
whether Kansas's sexual predator registration and notification law violated Ex Post
Facto Clause).
109. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.
110. See id. (adopting test in De Veau). The Artway court stated that in De Veau,
"the Supreme Court announced a subjective (or actual) legislative purpose test."
Id. at 1254. The Third Circuit explained that
[t]he question in each case where unpleasant consequences are
brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the
legislative aim was to punish that individual for the past activity, or
whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant inci-
dent to a regulation of a present situation.
Id.
111. See id. 1254-59 (analyzing development of "objective purpose" test).
112. See id. at 1263 (noting subparts of "objective purpose" test).
113. See id. (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)). Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, Halper articulates the "threshold question .. .
whether a remedial purpose can explain the sanction. Only if the remedial pur-
pose is insufficient to justify the measure, and one must resort also to retributive or
deterrent justifications, does the measure become punitive." Id. at 1255. To illus-
trate its interpretation of Halper, the Third Circuit offered a hypothetical:
"[A]ssume that someone is sent to the store in the snow for soupmeat. The trip
can be explained solely by the remedial purpose of obtaining food, even though
the trip through the cold could also serve retributive purposes." Id. at 1255-56.
According to the Third Circuit, this would not be punishment under Halper. See id.
at 1256. The court explained: "[A]ssume now that, without additional justifica-
tion, the agent is sent without clothes. This additional aspect of the trip cannot be
explained by the remedial purpose of obtaining food; this excursion can only be
explained as partly serving retributive purposes. It therefore constitutes 'punish-
ment' under ... Halper. . . ." Id.
114. See id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993)). The
court again explained, through a hypothetical, that "sending someone out into the
snow would be punishment if doing so was traditionally regarded as punitive and
1852 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
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the court must inquire into the true nature of the purported salutary pur-
pose of the provision.' 15 Under the third and final prong of the Artway
test, the court must look to the effects of the measure.' 1 6 The Third Cir-
cuit explained that a focus on effects is necessary to balance the possibility
that a legislature may have the best of intentions and still effectuate a mea-
sure that is too harsh to be considered nonpunitive.
1 17
the sender did not make his plausible remedial purposes clear. This would be the
case even though a remedial purpose-fetching soupmeat-could fully explain
the action." Id. at 1257 (emphasis omitted). Although Austin suggested focusing
on history, the Third Circuit applied it with some hesitancy because Austin ana-
lyzed what constitutes punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, an
issue not before the court in Artway. See id. at 1258 (noting methodology of Austin
is applicable to other punishment determinations). The court questioned whether
Austin establishes "that 'punishment' for purposes of one constitutional protection
is necessarily 'punishment' for another." Id. In this regard, the Third Circuit dis-
agreed with other circuits' conclusory holding that Austin categorically applies to
all cases regarding analysis of the punishment question. See id. But see United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We be-
lieve that the only fair reading of Austin is that it resolves the 'punishment' issue
with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well
as the Excessive Fine Clause."), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). The Third Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading of Austin as "resolving all forfeitures ... as
presumptively punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Artway,
81 F.3d at 1258; see also United States v. $184,505.01 United States Currency, 72
F.3d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting holding and reasoning of Ninth Circuit
in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found the historical
methodology of Austin, as opposed to its broad language and holding, applicable
to other punishment determinations. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1258 (noting that "his-
torical analysis is a staple of constitutional interpretation").
115. See Artway 81 F.3d at 1258 (noting that even some deterrent purpose in
remedial measures does not render measure "punishment"). In this regard, the
court should determine (1) whether historically the deterrent purpose of such a
law is a necessary complement to its salutary operation and (2) whether the mea-
sure under consideration operates in its "usual" manner, consistent with its histori-
cally mixed purposes. See id. (citing Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511
U.S. 767, 780-84 (1994)). The Third Circuit elaborated that "[t]he main signifi-
cance of the Kurth Ranch limitation is that, at least for measures that have histori-
cally served salutary functions, even some deterrent purpose will not render a
measure 'punishment."' Id. at 1259 (emphasis omitted). The Third Circuit noted
that this interpretation of Kurth Ranch is contrary to the First Circuit's interpreta-
tion in Stoller. See id. (disagreeing with First Circuit's interpretation of Halper and
Kurth Ranch in situations not involving fines or taxes). The First Circuit held in
Stoller that the Kurth Ranch decision was the general rule, except for in the situation
of monetary penalties, which should be decided under Halper. United States v.
Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 718 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that Kurth Ranch created "to-
tality of the circumstances" test and Halper is "exception" for "monetary penal-
ties"), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996). The Third Circuit refused to read
Halper as narrowly as the First Circuit in the absence of specific instruction from
the Supreme Court. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1259 n.24 (determining Halper and
Kurth Ranch must be synthesized). For a further discussion of Stoller, see supra note
36.
116. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.
117. See id. at 1260 ("[A] law can constitute unconstitutional 'punishment'
because of its effects."). The court noted that a measure with a harsh "sting" will
not render a measure "punishment" per se. See id. at 1261. Sometimes, however, a
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In applying the test to Megan's Law, the court concluded that the
law's registration provisions, as they applied to Artway, did not violate the
Constitution. 118 Applying the first prong, the Third Circuit noted that the
New Jersey Legislature enacted Megan's Law to combat "the danger of
recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other preda-
tory acts against children."1 19 Losing on the first prong, Artway argued
under the second inquiry that the objective purpose of the legislation pro-
duced a nonremedial result. 120 The Third Circuit disagreed and found
that the remedial objective of knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders
outweighed the fact that "the registrant may face some unpleasantness
from having to register and update his registration."' 2 1 Finally, the Third
Circuit found that, under the third prong, the sting of the registration
provisions of the statute were not too harsh in effect. 122
",sting' will be so sharp that it can only be considered punishment regardless of
the legislators' subjective thoughts. For example, the legislature with the purest
heart(s), could extend the prison sentences of all previously convicted sex offend-
ers for the sole reason of protecting potential future victims." Id.
118. See id. at 1267 ("[W]e conclude that registration under Megan's Law
does not constitute 'punishment' under any measure of the term.").
119. Id. at 1264. The court noted that there was limited evidence of the ac-
tual purpose of Megan's Law because of the way that the law was rushed into enact-
ment. See id.; see also Megan's Law: How Fair? How Effective?, supra note 104, at El
(noting that New Jersey Legislature moved quickly when enacting Megan's Law,
which was unusual for legislative bodies).
120. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265. Artway argued that the statute inflicted the
shame of punishment. See id. Artway also argued that Megan's Law had an uncon-
ditionally punitive effect on him by comparing the measure to "' [e] arly forms of
punishment contain [ing] strong elements of gross public humiliation .... Physi-
cal punishments .. .were carried out publicly in ceremonial fashion [because it
was] intended that the victim should be humiliated, for degradation figured
largely in all contemporary theories of punishment.'" Id. (alterations in original)
(quoting Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of
Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1357, 1360-61 (1989)); see also Claire M.
Kimball, Note, A Modern Day Arthur Dimmesdale: Public Notification When Sex Offend-
ers Are Released into the Community, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1187, 1187 n.1 (1996)
("Laws that provide for community notification when sexual offenders are released
are often referred to as 'scarlet letter laws' because they 'brand' the individual as
sex offender in the eyes of the community."). The Third Circuit explained that
these assertions were irrelevant because it evaluated only the registration provi-
sions of Megan's Law. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265 ("[T]he notification issue is not
before us."). The court concluded that the registration provisions "bear little re-
semblance to the Scarlet Letter," because they "[do] not involve public notifica-
tion." Id.
121. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265. The Third Circuit also noted that "the means
chosen-registration and law enforcement notification only-is not excessive in
any way." Id.
122. See id. at 1266-67. In finding that the effects of Megan's Law were not too
harsh, the Third Circuit again emphasized that it was only addressing the registra-
tion provision of Megan's Law. See id. at 1266. Artway asserted a strong basis for
concluding that notification would produce "devastating effects," but the court did
not address the constitutionality of the notification provisions of Megan's Law. Id.
The court explained that the impact of the registration provisions "cannot be said
1854 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
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B. Taylor v. Cisneros: Explaining Where All the Pieces Fit in the
Third Circuit
In Artway, the Third Circuit "attempted to harmonize a body of doc-
trine that . . . caused much disagreement in the federal and state
courts." 123 In formulating the Artway test, the Third Circuit explained
that its analysis was "by no means perfect. Only the Supreme Court knows
where all the pieces belong. The Court will, we hope, provide more gui-
dance ... in the near future." 124 In Ursey, the Supreme Court issued a
decision that appeared to provide that guidance. 12 5 In Taylor v. Cis-
neros,126 the Third Circuit addressed whether Ursery's application to a state
eviction proceeding was appropriate. 127
1. Facts of Taylor
Silas Taylor used to reside in Bayonne, New Jersey, in low-income
housing subsidized by the New Jersey Housing Authority. 128 In 1992, Tay-
lor pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics paraphernalia in the Bayonne
Municipal Court.129 Taylor committed this offense on the property of the
Housing Authority on which he resided, though not in his apartment.130
In 1994, Taylor again pleaded guilty to the same offense, this time commit-
ted on the property adjacent to his apartment complex.' 3 1 The Bayonne
Municipal Court sentenced Taylor to thirty days in prison and to a fine of
$625 on the second conviction.' 3 2
to have an effect so draconian that it constitutes 'punishment' in any way ap-
proaching incarceration." Id. at 1267.
123. Id. at 1263.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139-42 (1996) (addressing con-
stitutionality of civil forfeiture).
126. 102 F.3d 1334 (3d Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 1343 (noting that "arguably Ursery [was] distinguishable" because it
involved in rem proceedings).
128. See id. at 1336. The fair market rental value of Taylor's apartment was
$706 a month. See id. Because the Housing Authority subsidized his rent, he paid
only $125 a month in rent. See id. Taylor was also hearing and speech impaired.
See id. His only income was a disability payment of $497 a month from social secur-
ity. See id. The court concluded that, if evicted, Taylor would have no place to live
and would become homeless. See id.
129. See id, (noting that possession of drug paraphernalia is violation of Com-
prehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1).
130. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1336.
131. See id. (noting second offense was not committed on Housing Authority
property).
132. See id. at 1337. The parties did not specify the penalty for Taylor's first
offense, however, they did not dispute that it was similar to that of the second
offense. See id.
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These criminal penalties were not the end of the implications of the
drug charges.1 3 3 New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act,13 4 applicable to both
public and private housing, outlines the circumstances under which a
landlord may legally remove a tenant from a rental unit.135 Under subsec-
tion 61.1n of the Anti-Eviction Act, if one is convicted or pleads guilty to
an offense under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987,136 involv-
ing possession of drug paraphernalia "within or upon the leased premises
or the building or complex of buildings and land appurtenant thereto...
in which those premises are located, the landlord may evict the tenant."13 7
Removal of a tenant pursuant to the Anti-Eviction Act is an in personam
action. 13 8 Because Taylor pleaded guilty to such a charge, the Housing
Authority was authorized to evict Taylor from his apartment.1 39
On November 29, 1994, the Housing Authority served notice on Tay-
lor that it was removing him from the apartment pursuant to subsection
61.In of the Anti-Eviction Act.' 40 In response to the eviction proceeding,
Taylor filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that his evic-
tion would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had previously
been prosecuted and punished for the crime of possession of drug para-
phernalia. 4 1 Taylor also asserted that his eviction would violate the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and
would violate his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 142
2. The District Court
The district court held that Taylor's eviction did not violate either the
Double Jeopardy or Excessive Fines Clauses of the Constitution. 143 The
133. See id. (noting conviction for drug offense on leased premises is suffi-
cient grounds for removal).
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1996).
135. See id. (listing 16 reasons for lawful eviction of tenant).
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 1996).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:18-61.1n.
138. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1343.
139. See id. at 1337 ("[W]ithout question, the Housing Authority may evict
Taylor under the Anti-Eviction Act .... ).
140. See id. The court noted that the Housing Authority indicated that the
removal notice was based upon both offenses, however, the court questioned
whether the second offense could be the basis for Taylor's removal because the
incident did not occur on the Housing Authority's property. See id. at 1337 n.1.
Because the first incident clearly put Taylor within the scope of subsection 61.1n,
the court considered it a nonissue. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. The Housing Authority sought "summary dispossession" of Tay-
lor's apartment in the Superior Court of New Jersey. See id. The state court stayed
those proceedings, at Taylor's request, until the federal courts resolved his § 1983
claim. See id.
143. See id. at 1337-38. In the district court, the parties disagreed as to
whether Taylor's claim should be considered an "as applied" challenge or a facial
challenge to subsection 61.1n. SeeTaylor v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D.NJ.
1995), aff'd, 102 F.3d 1334 (3d Cir. 1996). An applied challenge to this statute
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district court concluded that the eviction proceedings against Taylor were
not intended to punish. 14 4 The court explained that the label on a stat-
ute, whether "civil" or "criminal," is not relevant. 14 5 The court pointed
out that proceedings under subsection 61.1n of the Anti-Eviction Act are
not intended to punish because "the eviction of. . . '[a] tenant is a ra-
tional and effective means of protecting all other tenants from activity anti-
thetical to their health, safety and welfare.' 1 14 6 The district court also
rejected Taylor's excessive fines argument because it concluded that the
sanction pursuant to subsection 61.1n was not punitive. 14 7
3. The Third Circuit
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Taylor argued that his eviction under
subsection 61.1n was punitive because it had a "retributive function," de-
spite some remedial characteristics. 148 He claimed that under NewJersey
law, an eviction constituted a forfeiture. 1 49  He further asserted that the
court should consider his fine excessive because his offenses were mi-
nor. 150 Taylor also argued that the eviction proceeding violated the prohi-
would be based upon "the specific circumstance of Taylor's convictions and misfor-
tune." See id. In other words, Taylor asserted that the statute at issue was not un-
constitutional on its face, but rather that it was unconstitutional as it applied to
him as an indigent who was being evicted from his subsidized housing and, most
likely, being made homeless. See id. The court, however, concluded that because
the state court had not applied the statute to the facts of this case it would be
inappropriate to consider the case an "as applied challenge." Id. As such, the
district court treated the action as a facial challenge. See id.
On appeal, Taylor argued that his challenge to 61.In should not have been
treated as a facial challenge. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1338. He explained that he did
not challenge the general constitutionality of subsection 61.1n, but rather as it
applied to him. See id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987);
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 445 U.S. 489, 497 (1982);Jacobs v. Florida
Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 905-06 (11th Cir. 1995)). The Third Circuit, however, did "not
linger on the distinction between a facial and an as applied challenge because we
find that subsection 61.In is constitutional as applied to Taylor." Id. at 1339-40.
144. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1338.
145. See id. at 1337.
146. Id. at 1338 (quoting Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 321). The district court
noted that the causes for eviction in the Anti-Eviction Act are the only basis upon
which a landlord may seek eviction outside "the traditional, and more cumber-
some, common law ejectment action[s]." Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 317. The court
explained that the Anti-Eviction Act "is considered remedial legislation designed
to address the serious housing shortage that has plagued New Jersey." Id.
147. See Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 323.
148. Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 8, Taylor v. Cis-
neros, 102 F.3d 1334 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-5873)).
149. See id. (citing A.P. Dev. Corp. v. Band, 550 A.2d 1220, 1222 (N.J. 1988);
Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 228 A.2d 674, 680 (N.J. 1967)).
150. See id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 23, Taylor (No. 95-5873)). Taylor
argued that, based on the fact that he received a rental subsidy of $581 per month
and he could potentially remain in the apartment for over the next 20 years, he is
losing subsidies potentially worth more than $100,000. See id. He asserted such a
loss was excessive compared to the offense. See id.
1997] 1857
27
Patterson: Constitutional Law - To Punish or Not to Punish - That Is the Que
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
bition against double jeopardy because his eviction would not serve a
remedial purpose, and moreover, that the court should render it punish-
ment because eviction was a measure disproportionate to his conduct.1 5 '
Initially, the State of New Jersey argued that the Artway test controlled
the definition of punishment for double jeopardy purposes.' 2 The State
then modified its position after the Supreme Court's decision in Ursery and
asserted that Ursery undermined the Artway analysis and controlled in this
case.
153
At the outset of the opinion, the Third Circuit recognized the rele-
vance of Artway and Ursery.154 Instead of clarifying which case controlled
in the disposition, the court resolved Taylor's double jeopardy claim
under both Ursery and Artway and then addressed his excessive fine claim
under Austin.155 The court concluded that the eviction proceedings of
151. See id.
152. See id. For a discussion of the Artway test, see supra notes 108-17 and
accompanying text.
153. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1339.
154. See id. at 1341 ("Artway... and Ursery ... inform our result.").
155. See id. The Third Circuit also noted that it would decide the excessive
fines issue under United States v. Various Computers and Computer Equipment, 82 F.3d
582 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 406 (1996). See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1341.
In Various Computers, the Third Circuit did not invoke the Artway test to reach its
conclusion that civil in rem forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (C) does not
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Various Computers, 82 F.3d at
586-89. In Various Computers, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unau-
thorized use of a credit card pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2) and (a) (3). See
Various Computers, 82 F.3d at 583. After the court sentenced the defendant for this
criminal conduct, the Government instituted forfeiture proceedings pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (C), which allows for the forfeiture of proceeds that were the
subject of a § 1029 offense. See id. at 584 n.2. The court sentenced the defendant
to 10 years in prison and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of
$13,674.50. See id. at 584. In addressing whether this subsequent forfeiture action
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the court followed the analysis of the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994). See Various Computers,
82 F.3d at 588. In Tilley, the Fifth Circuit held that forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (6) and (a) (7) was not punishment because it does not take away anything
in which the possessor had a legal interest or expectation that govemment should
protect. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300. The Third Circuit had already adopted the Tilley
analysis in United States v. $184,505.01 United States Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 48 (1996). See Various Computers, 82 F.3d at 588. In
$184,505.01 United States Currency, the Third Circuit "[found] the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning... to be sound." $184,505.01 United States Currency, 72 F.3d at 1172. As
such, the court extended its analysis to 19 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (C) in Various Com-
puters. See Various Computers, 82 F.3d at 588.
The defendant in Various Computers also asserted that the forfeiture under
§ 981 (a) (1)(C) violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 589. The court explained that because the forfeiture provision of the statute
does not constitute punishment, it cannot violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See
id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607 (1993)). It is apparent from
Various Computers that the question of whether a civil in rem forfeiture amounts to
punishment for double jeopardy and excessive fine purposes is not properly ana-
lyzed under Artway. See id.
1858 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 5 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss5/4
the Anti-Eviction Act passed all three prongs of the Artway test and, thus,
were not punishment.'5 6
Taylor argued that he would suffer severely from an eviction. 15 7 In
addressing this argument, the Third Circuit pointed to the language in
Ursety for assistance. 15 8 In Ursery, the Supreme Court explained that "for
Double Jeopardy purposes we have never balanced the value of property
forfeited in a particular case against the harm suffered by the Government
in that case."1 59 Thus, the Third Circuit incorporated the relevant teach-
ings of Ursery into the Artway analysis in resolving an issue of whether a civil
sanction is punitive.
160
156. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1342. Under the subjective prong, the Third Cir-
cuit began its analysis with the fact that the Anti-Eviction Act "provides that for
certain residential properties a tenant may be removed only for 'good cause."' Id.
at 1341 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1n (West 1996)). The court con-
cluded this requirement indicated that "61.1n ... is nothing more than the legisla-
ture's recognition that it is unreasonable to deny a landlord the right to terminate
a lease when its property is being used for purposes unlawful under the NewJersey
Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987." Id. Thus, under subsection 61.1n, the
landlord has the discretion to remove a tenant. See id. This was enough proof for
the court to hold that the purpose of subsection 61.1n was not to punish the ten-
ant but to give the landlord the necessary legal force to keep his or her property
safe. See id. ("[The Legislature] ... merely permitted the landlord to protect its
property from a tenant violating the law on the property.").
The court held that subsection 61.1n also passed the objective prong under
Artway. See id. at 1342. The court addressed two questions under the Artway objec-
tive prong. In answering the first question under that prong, whether the section
served solely a remedial purpose, the court explained that subsection 61.In has
"solely ... the remedial purpose" of protecting a landlord from the dangers of
having unlawful activity occur on his or her property. Id. The court explained that
landlords should not be subjected to unlawful activity on their property because
"under both federal and NewJersey law a landlord in some circumstances runs the
risk of its property being forfeited if it is aware of unlawful drug activity on its
premises and does not take steps to end that activity." Id. Under the second ques-
tion of the Artway objective prong, whether history supports a punitive or remedial
purpose of the measure, the court observed that "removal of a tenant from a prop-
erty traditionally has not been regarded as a punishment." Id. The Anti-Eviction
Act provides for eviction under other circumstances that could not be considered
punitive. See id.
Finally, the court addressed the third and final prong of Artway, an inquiry
into the effects of the measure. See id. The Taylor court held the effects of subsec-
tion 61.1n were not too harsh because that determination does not hinge on "the
value of the property forfeited in a particular case .. .[or] the harm suffered by
the government." Id.
157. See id. ("[Taylor] points out that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
said that a 'forfeiture is in the nature of a penalty."' (quoting Lehigh Valley R.R.
Co. v. Chapman, 171 A.2d 653, 660 (1961))).
158. See id. ("[I]n Ursery, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeitures gener-
ally do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.")
159. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2145 (1996).
160. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1342. In Ursery, the Supreme Court distinguished
Halper because it dealt with civil penalties and not civil forfeiture. Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
at 2138. In Taylor, the Third Circuit noted that, according to the Supreme Court,
Halper only extends to cases involving double jeopardy challenges to civil penalties,
not civil forfeiture, because forfeiture does not invoke an analysis of balancing the
1997] CASEBRIEF 1859
29
Patterson: Constitutional Law - To Punish or Not to Punish - That Is the Que
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 1831
The court then explained that it only assumed the applicability of
Artway after Ursery.161 In conceding that assumption may not be correct,
the court analyzed the case under Ursery as well.' 62 The court explained
that Ursery focused on in rem civil forfeiture and Taylor dealt with an in
personam action. 163 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that "arguably"
this distinction could render Ursery inapplicable to Taylor.1 64 Applying Ur-
sery, the Third Circuit explained that the court must decide whether the
legislature intended eviction proceedings under subsection 61.1n "to be
criminal or civil and whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact that
they may not be viewed as civil regardless of the legislature's intent."
1 65
Under that test, the court concluded that an eviction pursuant to the Anti-
Eviction Act is not a punitive measure.166 The court also concluded that
an eviction under subsection 61.1n of the Anti-Eviction Act is not punitive
for the reasons it set forth in the Artway analysis and for the historical
understanding that evictions serve remedial purposes.
16 7
harm to the government against the cost of the forfeiture. Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1341
(citing Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144). In Taylor, the court also explained that its con-
clusion that the effects of the eviction were not so harsh as to be considered pun-
ishment "[was] hardly surprising; if the termination of social security benefits,
which can be critical to a disabled or elderly person, is not a punishment then why
should the loss of a lease be punishment?" Id. at 1342.
161. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1342.
162. See id. at 1343.
163. See id. The distinction between in rem and in personam civil sanctions is
significant in assessing whether a measure is punitive for constitutional purposes.
See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138 (placing significant emphasis on fact that Congress did
not intend forfeiture proceeding as punitive because action was in rem and not
against person); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363
(1984) (same); United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 575 (1931) (holding that
in personam proceeding to impose taxes upon defendant for sale of liquor is "an
action to recover a penalty for an act declared to be a crime [and], in its nature, a
punitive proceeding, although it take[s] the form of a civil action; and the word
'prosecution' is not inapt to describe such an action"); United States v. Reyes, 87
F.3d 676, 682 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The Ursery opinion ... gives heavy emphasis to
the in rem nature of the forfeitures there at issue, and distinguishes Halper and
Kurth Ranch largely because those cases involved in personam proceedings.").
164. Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1343.
165. Id. (citing Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147).
166. See id. (rejecting Taylor's claim under Ursey analysis).
167. See id. In Taylor, the Third Circuit also made some final points to solidify
its conclusions concerning double jeopardy. Id. In this regard, the court noted
that Taylor's double jeopardy claim failed because an eviction under subsection
61.1n is not part of the criminal system. See id. The Housing Authority is not a
prosecutor. See id. Rather, in evicting Taylor, "the housing authority pursu[ed] a
traditional civil remedy which both public and private landlords seek." Id. The
court also pointed out that eviction under subsection 61.1n, unlike the registration
provisions of Megan's Law at issue in Artway, is not mandatory. See id. The court
also noted that a landlord could provide in a lease that the violation of drug laws
on the premises is grounds for eviction. See id. Finally, the court commented that
"[i] t would be strange" if a landlord was unable "to evict a tenant for drug activities
because a prosecutor had brought criminal proceedings against the tenant for the
activities." Id. at 1343-44. Such a result would unfairly increase the landlord's own
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At the conclusion of the opinion, the court addressed Taylor's exces-
sive fine argument under Austin.168 The court explained that under Aus-
tin, "[t] he test for whether a civil in rem forfeiture constitutes punishment
under the Excessive Fines Clause ... is slightly different" from the double
jeopardy analysis. 169 The Third Circuit explained that Austin mandates a
two-part inquiry for assessing the punitive nature of a forfeiture statute. 170
First, the court should assess whether forfeiture was understood as punish-
ment when the United States ratified the Eighth Amendment. 171 Second,
the court should assess whether the forfeiture involved in the case at bar
"should be so understood today." 172 The Third Circuit explained that the
second prong of the Artway analysis, the objective prong, incorporates that
inquiry. 173 Having already determined that subsection 61.1n was not pu-
nitive, the court concluded that it also did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.1 7 4
C. The Current State of the Law in the Third Circuit
In E.B. v. Verniero,175 the Third Circuit clarified the precedential im-
pact of Ursery on Artway.1 76 In Verniero, the court upheld the constitution-
ality of the notification provisions of Megan's Law, a question the court
left open in Artway. 1 7 7 The convicted sex offenders in Verniero argued that
risk of forfeiting his property to the state or federal government for failing to re-
port such activities. See id. at 1344.
168. See id. at 1344.
169. Id. ("[T]hus, even though the state proceeding against Taylor [was] in
personam, Taylor [had] less of a burden in meeting the Excessive Fines Clause
standard.")
170. See id.
171. See id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610-611 (1993)).
172. Id. (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11).
173. See id. For a discussion of the objective prong of the Artway test, see supra
notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
174. See Taylor, 82 F.3d at 1344 (affirming judgment of lower court).
175. 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 1093-94 (stating that Ursery does not undermine appropriateness of
Artway).
177. Id. at 1092-1105. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit declined to
address the constitutionality of the notification provisions of Megan's Law, see
supra note 120.
In Verniero, the named appellant registered with the authorities subsequent to
his parole for sex crimes against young boys. See Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1087-88. The
New Jersey Superior Court, upon consideration of objection from E.B., held that
he was properly classified as a Tier 3 offender and that notification was appropriate
to 82 public and private educational institutions, licenced day care centers and
summer camps and all residences within a one block radius of E.B.'s house. See id.
at 1088. For a discussion of the classification of offender status under Megan's
Law, see supra note 102.
The court held that the notification provisions of Megan's Law do not amount
to punishment under the Artway test. See Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1105. In assessing
the legislative purpose of Megan's Law, the first prong of Artway, the court referred
to the Supreme Court's finding in Artway that the legislative purpose of the regis-
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after Ursery the Artway synthesis was no longer appropriate for determining
whether the notification provisions of Megan's Law constituted punish-
ment.178  Having the guidance from both Artway and Ursery, the Third
tration provisions were not punitive, but rather were remedial. See id. at 1096-97.
Accordingly, the court explained that the legislative intent of the notification pro-
visions of Megan's Law also serve the remedial purpose of protecting against the
danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders. See id. at 1097.
. In addressing the second prong of Artway, the objective purpose of the provi-
sion, the court concluded "that the Tier 2 and 3 dissemination of information
beyond law enforcement personnel is reasonably related to the nonpunitive goals
of Megan's Law." Id. at 1098. In turning to the historical precedent of public
notification, one of the factors a court should address under the second prong of
Artway, the court noted that the appellants claimed that "the dissemination of in-
formation beyond law enforcement personnel is closely analogous to the well-rec-
ognized historical punishments of public shaming, humiliation and banishment as
those practices were employed in colonial times." Id. at 1099. Nonetheless, the
court held that "[d]issemination of such information in and of itself, however, has
never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest." Id. at 1099-1100. Additionally, the court addressed whether
the remedial purpose of the measure cannot fairly be said to justify all of its as-
pects. See id. at 1101. This is another question a reviewing court should ask under
the second prong of Artway. See id. Under this analysis, the court restated "that the
remedial purpose of Megan's Law justifies all of its aspects." Id.
Under the third and final prong of the Artway test, the effects of the measure,
the court faced the issue of whether public shaming amounted to unconstitutional
punishment. See id. at 1101-05. The court interpreted Artway to require that in
order for the effects of a measure to render it "punishment," those effects must be
extremely onerous. See id. at 1101. Accordingly, the court held that "[t]he direct
effects of Megan's Law clearly do not rise to the level of extremely onerous bur-
dens that sting so severely as to compel a conclusion of punishment." Id. The
court explained that the indirect effects, such as loss of employment, injury to
reputation and societal shunning, although harsh, are not punishment. See id. at
1102.
. 178. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1094-95. The district court held that Ursery rejected
the legal foundation of Artway. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1208-09
(D.N.J. 1996), rev'd sub nom. E.B. v: Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997). The
district court explained that Ursery presented a new approach to addressing pun-
ishment that completely incapacitates the logical basis of the Artway test. See id. In
Poritz, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey refused to
apply the Artway analysis in assessing the constitutionality of the notification provi-
sions of Megan's Law. See id. The district court explained that Ursery "presented a
different approach" to these issues. Id. The court held that Ursery rejects the "phil-
osophical foundation of Artway: that a universal rule for the definition of 'punish-
ment' can and should be derived through a 'synthesis' achieved from analyzing the
Supreme Court's recent decisions." Id.
The appellees also argued that the Artway synthesis was undermined by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). See
Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1094. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld a Kansas stat-
ute that provides for the civil commitment of "sexually violent predators." See Hen-
dricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a07 (1996)
(providing that person convicted or charged with offense and suffering from
"mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to en-
gage in the predatory acts of sexual violence," may be confined to state custody for
"control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large"). The
court stated that "[i]n determining the continuing viability of Artway, therefore, [it
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Circuit held that Ursery did not incapacitate the Artway synthesis. 179
Rather, the Third Circuit explained that, in its view, the Artway test is har-
monious to the rationale in Ursery. °80 The court explained that if it "disre-
gard[ed] the Artway standard, [it] would be required, once again, to
'divine' a 'test for punishment' by looking for common considerations in
essentially the same set of Supreme Court precedents."1 8 1 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit explained that Ursery "confirms" that the Artway test is an
appropriate standard and that it would not materially change the result of
a case to devise a new test for assessing the punitive nature of a statute.
182
is necessary to give] careful consideration to how Hendricks addressed the question
of whether civil commitment is punishment." Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1095. The
Third Circuit found that there was "substantial overlap between the factors relied
on in Hendricks and those that comprise the Artway test" and, thus, the court "dis-
cern[ed] no need to abandon (or overhaul) Artway." Id. The Third Circuit ex-
plained that "[I]ike Urseyy, Hendricks does not establish a single formula for
identifying which legislative measures constitute punishment and which do not."
Id. Like the court in Artway, Hendricks made an inquiry into the legislative intent of
the statute. See id. The court in Verniero also noted that Hendricks goes beyond the
legislature's stated intent to consider additional factors that Artway incorporates
into its objective purpose prong. See id. ("Like Artway's inquiry into proportional-
ity, Hendricks repeatedly describes how the Kansas statute is tailored to achieve its
remedial purpose of protecting the public."). Hendricks, like Artway, relied heavily
on history. See id. (noting that Supreme Court analogized civil confinement in
Kansas statute to quarantines of those with highly contagious diseases, and noted
that it has "never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining
those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to
others"). The Third Circuit further noted that Hendricks emphasized assessing the
true salutary nature of a measure. See id. (noting that Hendricks Court looked to
"multiple purposes of the Kansas statute, including incapacitation of dangerous
sex offenders as well as their treatment" and concluded that statute did not consti-
tute punishment). Finally, the court explained that even though the Court in Hen-
dricks "does not explicitly discuss" the effects of the measure, the court found
nothing in "Hendricks inconsistent with Artway's direction to examine what the
challenged measure actually does to the affected individuals." Id. at 1095-96.
179. See Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1094 ("Ursety provides no justification for aban-
doning [the Artway] standard.").
180. See id. ("Appellees insist that after Ursery and Hendricks, Artway does not
provide an appropriate standard for determining whether Megan's Law notifica-
tion constitutes 'punishment' for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeop-
ardy Clauses. We disagree.").
181. Id. at 1094 n.14. The court explained that the "holding of Ursery is a
narrow one limited to civil forfeitures. Neither of the principal rationales support-
ing its conclusion is pertinent here and we find nothing in the Court's reasoning
that is inconsistent with the Artway standard. It necessarily follows that Ursery pro-
vides no justification for abandoning that standard." Id. at 1094.
182. See id. ("Ursery confirms... (1) measures motivated by retributive animus
are punishment, (2) even when the legislative action is not so motivated, an ad-
verse consequence resulting from an in personam proceeding may be punishment if
it is disproportionate to the remedial goal which the measure purports to pursue,
and (3) measures that have traditionally been regarded as nonpunitive are not
punishment in the absence of a retributive motive.").
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It is clear that in the Third Circuit, Ursery does not overrule the Artway
synthesis. 183 The question that persists after Taylor is to what extent does
the analysis in each case coexist. The analysis in Taylor does not resolve
whether the Ursery test applies beyond a double jeopardy challenge to civil
in rem forfeiture. 18 4 The Third Circuit stated that Ursery is "arguably" dis-
tinguishable in cases addressing in personam civil sanctions.185 Arguably,
Ursery, on the one hand, could apply strictly to double jeopardy challenges
to civil in rem forfeiture, and Artway, on the other hand, should control in
cases that challenge other in personam actions, such as registration and no-
tification provisions of sexual registration and notification laws. 186 None-
theless, in Taylor, the Third Circuit applied the Artway test and
incorporated relevant guidance from Ursery in assessing the effects prong
183. See id.
184. Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334, 1343 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e do not
decide whether the forfeiture involved here is governed by Ursery for double jeop-
ardy purposes.").
185. See id. In personam actions invoke greater constitutional protection. See
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996) (addressing legislature's in-
tent in enacting forfeiture and pointing out that "forfeiture proceedings ... are in
rem .... 'In contrast to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem
have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent
upon seizure of a physical object."' (quoting United States v. One Assortment of
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984))). Some courts have limited the application
of Ursery to civil in rem actions. See United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 682 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1996) (" Ursery... gives heavy emphasis to the in rem nature of the forfeitures
there at issue, and distinguishes Halper and Kurth Ranch largely because those cases
involved in personam proceedings."); Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53, 59
(Colo. 1996) (applying Halper proportionality test in addressing constitutionality of
in personam license suspension because Ursery "is clearly limited to the civil forfei-
ture context" and Halper focuses on in personam civil penalties); State v. Gustafuson,
668 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 n.2 (Ohio 1996) (explaining that Ursery is not applicable in
cases addressing license suspension because it is not in rem action). Still, other
courts have implicated Ursery when addressing challenges to in personam actions.
See United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811,815 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding two-part
analysis in Ursery useful in addressing punitive nature of statute allowing for in
personam suspension of motorist's license and determining that Halper, Austin or
Kurth Ranch were not helpful in analysis); United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954,
956 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that, under Ursery, in personam debarment proceed-
ings were not punitive), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 622 (1996). For a discussion of the
important distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings in this area of
law, see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
186. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1343 (noting potential limited reach of Ursery); see
also Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2141 (drawing sharp distinction between in rem and in
personam civil penalties in concluding that civil in rem forfeiture is not punishment
for double jeopardy purposes); Various Items of Personal Property v. United
States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (stating that, in in rem proceedings, it is "the prop-
erty which is proceeded against, and... held guilty and condemned as though it
were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient" and "[i] n a criminal prosecu-
tion it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and pun-
ished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense").
1864
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of the test and Taylor's in personam eviction. 187 Accordingly, Taylor exem-
plifies the application of both standards and illustrates that both standards
should coexist until the Supreme Court defines the analysis further.
1 8 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether parallel civil and criminal proceedings violate
the Constitution is ever prevalent and complex in the present-day legal
arena.1 89 Forfeiture persists as a method for ensuring that criminals com-
pensate the government.19 0 In personam license suspensions remain a pop-
ular tool among the states to fight drunk driving. 19 1 Taxes, debarment
proceedings and numerous other civil penalties are also prevalent civil
sanctions.' 9 2 All of these measures are subject to the constitutional
prohibitions against punishment.' 93 As the number and types of civil
sanctions increase, the issue of the constitutionality of such measures be-
comes more complex.1 94 The law in the area of unconstitutional punish-
187. Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1341 ("Artway, Various Computers, and Ursery... inform
our result."). For a discussion of how the Third Circuit used Ursery in applying the
Artway test, see supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
188. See Taylor, 102 F.3d at 1343.
189. See Mack, supra note 9, at 218 (noting that double jeopardy law is confus-
ing, contradictory and fraught with exceptions).
. 190. See LEvy, supra note 10, at 88 (discussing increased use of forfeiture to
combat rise in crime and drug use); Cole, supra note 9, at 251 ("[The] forfeiture
remedy continues to spread.").
191. See, e.g., Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53, 59-60 (Colo. 1996) (in-
voking Halper as controlling precedent in challenge to in personam license suspen-
sion and distinguishing Urseiy because it only addressed civil in rem forfeiture
statute); State v. Gustafson, 668 N.E.2d 435, 442 n.2 (Ohio 1996) ("Ursery does not
control disposition of the cases before us, which do not involve in rem civil forfeit-
ures, but rather administrative suspensions of drivers' licenses."). In Gustafson, the
court noted that it was not clear whether the Supreme Court would "confine appli-
cation of Ursery solely to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings, or... [would] apply it
more broadly, thereby minimizing the importance of Halper and its progeny as
precedent." Id. As a result, the court saw it fitting to apply Halper and its progeny
to the license suspension. See id. at 443.
192. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992)
(addressing double jeopardy challenge to administrative order excluding physi-
cian from participating in Medicare program for at least five years following doc-
tor's conviction and sentencing on criminal charges of Medicare fraud); United
States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577 (11th Cir. 1991) (addressing double jeopardy
challenge to disciplinary proceeding after criminal charge of misappropriation of
postal funds that followed disciplinary suspension).
193. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 (1994)
(noting that all types of civil sanctions are subject to constitutional scrutiny). For a
discussion of these constitutional protections, see supra notes 4-8 and accompany-
ing text.
194. See Mack, supra note 9, at 218 (noting that Supreme Court justices have
created "entirely new areas of double jeopardy interpretation with respect to paral-
lel civil and criminal proceedings"); see also United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710,
713 (1st Cir. 1996) (addressing whether administrative sanction imposed by Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation is punishment for double jeopardy purposes
1997] 1865CASEBRIEF
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ment and civil sanctions is ambiguous and unsettled. 195 The analysis in
both Artway and Taylor reflect the complex legal analysis in assessing the
constitutionality of the emerging civil sanctions in the present-day legal
arena. There are no bright-line rules and settled applications of the
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.19 6 Nevertheless, in the Third
Circuit, the Artway test persists as a guide to assessing the constitutionality
of civil sanctions of varying types.197
CarolineJ. Patterson
and exploring "shadowy corner[s] of the Double Jeopardy Clause, dimly lit by a
trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases"), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996).
195. See Mack, supra note 9, at 218 (noting double jeopardy law is so confus-
ing that "no sensible meaning or policy has evolved").
196. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 749 (Mass.
1996) (noting that when assessing constitutional protections against punishment,
distinction between double jeopardy, due process and ex post facto protections "is
not self-defining, so that a system of doctrine distinguishing one from the other
has grown up").
197. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1096-1105 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying
Artway test to notification provisions of Megan's Law); Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d
1334, 1343 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Artway test to in personam state eviction
proceeding).
1866 [Vol. 42: p. 1831
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